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Introduction
This paper constitutes an exploration of the construction of academic identity through 
a retrospective autoethnographic narrative analysis. In essentially experimental 
mode I set out to examine processes of  identification evident in this account, and in 
particular, the understanding of desire that resonates within it for,  it can be argued, 
without desire there is no identity. I began my analysis by following two lines of 
thought concerning desire.  The first, drawing on the work of  Jacques Lacan, 
conceives of desire negatively as lack (Fink, 1995; Lacan, 2001). The second 
deriving from the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (2004) constructs desire 
as abundance, a positive flow. These two conceptualisations may, at first sight, 
appear to be in opposition but could things be otherwise? The question I arrived at 
was to what extent can these different conceptualisations of desire be held to be 
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incommensurable or is it possible to arrive at an accommodation between desire as 
both lack and abundance? Reaching an impasse I turned to Slavoj Žižek, who 
as someone who is true to the late Lacan, is desperately searching for a way to 
come to terms with Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus/Thousand plateaus 
formulations, restaging in effect the late Lacan’s own attempt to come to terms 
with Deleuze & Guattari. (Jagodzinski, 2010, p.12)
Žižek’s ‘encounter between [these] two incompatible fields’  (2004, p. xi; original 
emphasis) provided the inspiration needed to locate the crux of the matter, and 
enabled me at least to reach an understanding of the question being addressed: if 
identification is always (already?) an inherently unstable process, located within a 
space which I shall designate a narrative space,  how does a mobilisation of desire 
which moves between lack and abundance enable a potentially fruitful re-
conceptualisation of processes of identification to emerge? 
The Discourse of the University. 
[The university is] full of people who have adopted the master signifiers of their 
institutions as their own, in a position of hysterical identification, imagining that 
in belonging to a “venerable” or “dynamic” or “powerful” institution, they too 
acquire these characteristics. (Bailey, 2009, p.159)
I am becoming hysterical. 
In the last Research Assessment Exercise (RAE2008)1 I desired,  above all else, and 
in the language of the  RAE , to be Returnable… 
At first I was a
Possible (Returnable)
Then I became a
Probable (Returnable)




(Ah, Sweet Mystery of Life at last I’ve found thee!
Ah! I know at last the secret of it all!
All the longing, seeking, striving, waiting, yearning
The burning hopes, the joy and idle tears that fall…)2
This desire was about identification and recognition as an academic. My 
subjection within the academy was complete – or was it? Where did this desire come 
from, this ‘microfascism’? What causes us, as Foucault says, ‘to desire the very thing 
that dominates and exploits us’ (Foucault, 2004, p. xv). This is the question that 
began to haunt me and it is this question that I set out to explore in this paper...
And I start with an exploration of desire from two seemingly opposed 
perspectives, first of all in the work of Jacques Lacan, for whom desire is understood 
within a negative ontology of lack; and secondly in the work of Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari, who see in desire a positive force characterised as abundance. Then I 
bring these different versions to bear in thinking about desire in relation to questions 
of identity and identification. 
Lacan in 3½ minutes
Obscure objects of desire 
A little known but interesting fact about Jacques Lacan was his predilection for 
Culebra cigars. Culebra cigars come in threes – braided together – but must be 
prised apart before being smoked. This may account for their rather odd 
appearance and tendency to look shabby when smoked. The reason for the 
existence of these strange objects is shrouded in mystery, as is the desire they 
provoke.
Lacan is notoriously difficult to follow. Indeed, McGee (1992, cited in Lather, 2007, 
p.85) says for Lacan ‘not being understood is an ethical imperative.’ Which explains 
a lot – but also creates possibilities, and of course, we should not fall into the trap of 
thinking of a singular Lacan – but instead a multiplicity – and not just an early or late 
Lacan, but in terms of a  Lacanian exegesis.
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Lacan famously said, ‘le désir de l’homme, c’est le désir de l’Autre’ – desire is 
the desire of the Other (quoted in Fink, 1995, p.54). An enigmatic phrase meaning 
variously: we desire what the Other desires, we desire what the Other desires of us, 
we desire that the Other desires us etc. Why does he say this? To understand 
Lacan’s desire we must go back to the infant stage, though I should say that my take 
on Lacan is ‘as a fable of development rather than a strict psychogenetic account’ 
(Rylance, 1994, p.116). 
The Lacanian subject is not the subject associated with the conscious ego or 
‘I’. The primordial ego emerges at the ‘mirror stage’ at which the infant first 
recognises its reflection, or rather, as Lacan would say, mis-recognises it (Lacan 
uses the term méconnaissance) giving rise ever after to the ego’s illusion of 
autonomy…
‘It is autonomous! That’s a good one’ (Lacan, 2001, p.100).
This is entry into the first realm, the imaginary realm – the realm of the senses. 
This first  attempt to produce a stable identity is thus a process of separation, ‘an 
intellectual and schismatic act of narcissism – a separation in which the I is another’ 
(Bailey, 2009, p.31). Primary or imaginary identification turns out to be a failure in 
terms of the production of a stable identity (being based on a complete mistake 
anyway), and is quickly followed up by entry into the second realm, the symbolic 
realm and acceptance of the ‘law’ of language. In effect we become alienated in 
language, the big Other, ‘an invidious, uninvited intruder that unceremoniously 
transforms our wishes’ (Fink, 1995,p. 6) but which nevertheless provides the only 
means by which we can communicate. 
According to Lacan, the point at which the individual enters the symbolic 
realm occasions a split between conscious and unconscious thought. The 
unconscious becomes a repository of the discourse of the Other. The Lacanian 
subject then, arising in the split between the conscious and the unconscious as the 
point where the individual enters the symbolic realm of language, makes a choice 
(which is no choice really) to submit to language: to become an effect of language – 
in other words discourse writes the subject. Subjectification, in the Lacanian sense, 
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is subordination to language. But, in order to gain entry to the symbolic we lose 
access to the third of Lacan’s realms – the Real. 
In Lacan’s system, paradoxically, the signified is the signified of the Real, but 
this is separated from the signifier from which it is barred. In the signifying system, 
therefore, the signified is a lack occurring at the intersection of the symbolic and the 
Real given an illusory appearance of reality by the continuous play of signifiers 
(Stavrakakis, 1999). Meaning is thus the meaning of the signifier, not the 
representation of some external signified. The Lacanian subject is the subject of the 
signifier – it is a relation of subordination. To enter the symbolic we have to accept 
the Law of Language. The symbolic order is the big Other.
Glynos and Stavrakakis (2000, p.205) put this rather neatly,
The real is what remains outside this field of representation, what remains 
impossible to symbolize. In fact, the gap between the real and reality is treated 
as axiomatically unbridgeable. Why? Because it serves to account for human 
desire, our unending (ultimately failed) attempts to colonize and domesticate 
the real with reality, to represent the real in discourse. 
This subordination in language results in the loss of the Real that is forever barred to 
us. The subject is marked by lack that it attempts to cover over – again and again. 
An aside
In making this move Lacan provides an ingenious solution to the problem of  what 
we might call ‘representationalism’ i.e. the tendency, even in our sophisticated 
poststructuralist times, to privilege the signified as the carrier of meaning. Lacan’s 
solution to this representationalist problem is to reverse the relationship between 
signified and signifier such that ‘meaning springs from the signifier to the signified’ 
rather than the other way round, in this way disrupting the relationship between 
signs and things. Lacan (2001, p.167) uses as an example of this two toilet doors 
each bearing a different signifier ‘Ladies’ and ‘Gentlemen’, 
          the image of twin doors symbolizing, through the solitary confinement offered 
Western Man for the satisfaction of his natural needs away from home, the 
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imperative that he seems to share with the great majority of primitive 
communities by which his life is subjected to the laws of urinary segregation.
Lacan admits this is a ‘low blow’ but he uses the example (and draws on the image 
of a myopic person whose ‘blinking gaze’ is directed towards the signifier) ‘to show 
how in fact the signifier enters the signified’. (Cixous, cited in Klages, 2001, uses 
this illustration as a metaphor for the different doors through which women and 
men enter into the symbolic order and, one might add, the different positions taken 
up once there). 
So, to sum up. When we enter the symbolic realm of language we lose the Real and 
our desire becomes colonised through language and  the desire of the Other. The 
subject is driven by this lack: ‘We never get what we were promised but that’s 
exactly why we keep longing for it’ (Stavrakakis, 1999, p.34).
At this point I want to introduce Louis Althusser. Louis Althusser and Jacques 
Lacan knew each other quite well (though one hesitates to say they were friends). In 
fact, Althusser got Lacan a room at the École Normale Superiéure after he was 
thrown out of Sainte-Anne’s hospital for making some disparaging remarks about the 
couples he was analysing (he was especially contemptuous of the wives). Lacan 
was in a bad way after this, Althusser writes, ‘Lacan called me a few days later and 
we had dinner…I remember the extraordinary cigar he always had in his mouth and 
me saying to him by way of greeting: “you roll your own!”’ (Althusser, 1994, p.186).
But this move to the École did not go down well. Althusser goes on, 
I never went to one of Lacan’s seminars. He spoke to a room full of people that 
was thick with smoke. It was for this reason that he was later asked to leave, 
because the smoke impregnated the books in the library immediately above. 
Despite severe warnings from Robert Flacelière, Lacan could never get his 
audience to refrain from smoking.
Though coming from different traditions  (‘I was going back to Marx and he to Freud, 
which meant we understood one another3’ [Althusser, 1994, p. 333]) there is clear 
conceptual link between the formation of the Lacanian subject and Althusser’s most 
enduring concept of interpellation. 
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Althusser (1971) argues that the function of ideology is to constitute individuals as 
subjects through a process of recognition that he calls ‘hailing’ or ‘interpellation’ by 
the Other. Althusser  refers to these Others as ‘ideological state apparatuses’ – the 
state, church etc – but we can extend this to apply the concept to discourses in the 
Foucauldian sense (had Foucault  ever used it in the Foucauldian sense, which 
Sawyer [2002] disputes)   adapting this to encompass the ideological dimensions 
that inhabit discourses,
Ideology ‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ among the 
individuals…by that very precise operation which I have called interpellation or 
hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace 
everyday police (or Other) hailing: ‘Hey, you there’. (Althusser, 1971, p.174).
This process is transparent – we think of ourselves as free subjects, this seems  
‘obvious’ to us - but this apparent obviousness, Althusser argues, is an effect of 
ideology. It is so obvious that we recognise what hails us, at the very moment at 
which it subjectivises us, ‘You and I are always already subjects and as such 
constantly practice the rituals of ideological recognition’ (Althusser, 1971, p.161).
Drawing on Lacan, Althusser talks about the ‘speculary’ nature of this process 
of interpellation by which ideology, through recognition, brings about subjection of 
the individual and at the same time calls them into being as a subject. He draws 
attention to the strange ambivalence in the term ‘subject’ – as one who is subjected 
and as one who, as a subject, is a free agent, ‘the individual is interpellated as a 
(free subject) in order that he shall submit freely to the commandments of the 
Subject i.e. in order that he shall freely accept his subjection’ (p.169). This  
‘identification with’ is the process of subjectivisation: we become subjects through 
the process of desiring what the Other desires of us. Going back then to 
Returnability as the object of my desire we can see this as a process of 
interpellation, I desired what the Other desired of me – I had been hailed by the 
ideological institution of the University-at-the-time-of-the-RAE.
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Deleuze and Guattari and a ‘machinics of desire’
Aside
It is tempting to use the forward slash when referring to Deleuze/Guattari (see 
Penley, 1997).
For Deleuze and Guattari (2004) however, desire is not constituted within a negative 
ontology of lack, instead, desire is a productive force. 
Whereas for Lacan, entry into the symbolic results in the loss of the Real with 
desire posited as driven by this originary lack, Deleuze and Guattari introduce the 
idea of ‘desiring-machines’ connected by positive and productive flows:
One machine is always coupled with another. The productive synthesis, the 
production of production, is inherently connective in nature: ‘and…’ ‘and 
then…’. This is because there is always a flow-producing machine, and another 
machine connected to it that interrupts or draws off part of this flow (the breast-
the mouth)...Desire constantly couples continuous flows…(Deleuze and 
Guattari,2004, p.5). 
Like Lacan, Deleuze and Guattari radically decentre the subject. In their case the 
‘subject’ is an assemblage of desiring machines, ‘the actualization of desire on the 
incorporeal surface of bodies’, as Bogard (1998, p.53) puts it. And he goes on 
‘Bodies only become subjects through an expression of their sense that is 
simultaneously a distribution of desire’ (p.58).
Deleuze and Guattari conceive the desiring-machines as linked to a recording 
surface over which heterogenous patterns of flow are possible, and which is able to 
interrupt and re-direct desire. They refer to this recording surface as the ‘body 
without organs’ (BwO). The BwO is an abstract machine -  an abstracting machine - 
and 
the liberation of the subject is equivalent to its transformation into an abstract 
machine, a revolutionary force of decoding, of breaking with the segmentary 
inscriptions that connect bodies and desires into oppressive, microfascist 
systems of production. (Bogard, 1998, p.71) 
The BwO is not itself productive. It halts the flow of desire in order to organ-ize it, to 
enable new connections and other forms of production, new patterns of desire to be 
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established between the desiring-machines that attach to it. It is a plane of 
immanence, of becoming, of possibility. A deterritorializing surface over which the 
autonomous ‘nomad' strides. In this mobilisation of desire my desire for Returnability 
in the RAE becomes a positive flow arising from  connections between desiring 
machines which stimulate my productivity, and increase my power. 
Lacan and Althusser contra Deleuze and Guattari? 
The tension between these two positions is only too evident. Lacan’s negative 
ontology of lack versus Deleuze and Guattari’s positive drive and abundance. The 
Lacanian view appears rather pessimistic and diminishing. Desiring only what the 
Other desires of me, and this desire ‘more exactly, is supported by a fantasy which 
has at least one foot in the Other, and precisely the one that counts, even and 
particularly if it happens to limp’ (Lacan, 1989, p.67). The Deleuze/Guattari take, by 
contrast, is affirming, voluptuous even. Who wouldn’t prefer this conceptualisation of 
desire with all its associations of excess and abundance, of sensual flows (and 
risqué talk of sperm and shit), over a rather depressing notion of lack?  But though it 
may be  tempting, given the persistence of binary opposites in the traces of Western 
Humanist thought,  perhaps we shouldn’t reduce the question of desire to a ‘choice’ 
between  desire-as-lack (implying control by the big Other) and  desire-as-
abundance (granting freedom and autonomy).
As previously intimated, Lacan’s dictum that desire is the desire of the Other 
is ambiguous. Another of Lacan’s famous statements is: there is no Other of the 
Other, no transcendent signifier which could act as ‘meta-guarantee of the 
consistency of the big Other’ (Žižek, 1997, unpaginated4). Something is lacking in the 
Other. This is because entry into the imaginary and then the symbolic realms occurs 
through processes of separation. This separation ‘brings forth being: creating a rift in 
the subject-Other whole, as a result of which the Other’s desire escapes the 
subject…Separation results in the splitting of the subject into ego and unconscious, 
and in a corresponding splitting of the Other into lacking Other (A barred) and object 
a’ (Fink, 1995, p.61). The object a (or  petit objet a - a for autre) is the object of 
desire, a tiny kernel of the Real precipitated out as a void when the Other becomes 
split. 
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So, we can never identify fully with the Other because the Other is also 
lacking – a gap always remains.  This lack in the Other creates a crack – a crack 
opening up possibilities for (a kind of) ‘autonomy and freedom of the subject’ 
(Zupančič, 2000, p.28). Ultimately, interpellation fails and we become caught in the 
interplay between complicity and resistance. And what of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
desiring machines and the BwO as the surface over which the nomad strides, able to 
couple and redirect flows of desire? Well, the BwO turns out to be rather more of an 
ambivalent concept than you might suppose, simultaneously ‘the locus of repression’ 
and ‘the potential for freedom’  as Holland (1999, p.31) puts it. 
To appreciate why this is so, we have to think of the BwO as something which 
attracts desiring machines to itself, which then seem to emanate from it, in this way 
establishing new connections between desiring machines and so organ-izing desire.  
What seems like my desire is in fact the desire of the BwO. What seems like my 
agency is in fact the emergence of subjectivity in this process. The BwO describes 
the interpellatory space within which a narrative of self finds its identification, re-
organ-izing my desire. In this version of events  then, the University captured, 
hijacked, my desire – re-organized it and channelled it as returnability in the RAE. 
The University was the Body without Organs!
Hence, we have a productive lack which gives rise to the possibilities of some 
sort of freedom of the subject through the failure of interpellation, and an abundance 
which holds out the promise of autonomy but which can paradoxically become the 
locus of repression. But has the Other really morphed into the BwO and vice versa? 
Or is this a move to far? It would be presumptuous of me to try to claim credit for 
arriving at a rapprochement between these apparently ontologically distinct 
positions,  after all, others too – including Žižek - have tried (as Jagodzinski’s 
remarks, quoted earlier, attest) but perhaps Žižek’s difficulty  allows us a way to 
examine this problematic. In Organs without bodies Žižek (2004, p.20) talks about 
the good Deleuze and the bad Deleuze – the good Deleuze is Deleuze alone, the 
bad Deleuze is when he is with Guattari. For Žižek, Guattari is a bad influence 
(indeed, Žižek holds that The Anti-Oedipus is Deleuze’s worst book and bemoans 
the  prominence granted it in the Anglophone world).  The good Deleuze, Žižek says, 
is a Lacanian, the bad Deleuze has been led astray by Guattari. So, there is a 
constant tension or contradiction within and between both Deleuze/Guattari and 
Deleuze seule. Deleuze of course, is (in)famous for his method of philosophical 
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buggery ‘taking an author from behind and giving him a child that would be his own 
offspring, yet monstrous’ (Deleuze 1995, p.6). Perhaps we can suggest that  (for 
Žižek) Deleuze/Guattari is the monstrous offspring produced as a result of Guattari’s 
seduction of Deleuze (hence the appositeness of the forward slash). Or maybe (and 
not to be outdone in the homoerotic reference department) the relationship is more 
spintrian (Lacan, 1989)  – Lacan, Deleuze, Guattari - with Žižek the unnatural result 
(though surely now too old, too established, frankly, too  bearded to play the role still 
so frequently attributed to him of ‘enfant terrible’5). But I digress. Why does Žižek 
make this accusation? 
Sinnerbrink (2006), in a highly critical account of Žižek’s Organ without bodies 
(2004), nevertheless sets out Žižek’s argument quite neatly. 
Figure 1. ‘The Body without Organs’ (© Bruce Tuckey6) . Or could it, in 
fact, be Žižek’s Organ without bodies? 
‘Deleuze I’ – the early pre-Guattarian Deleuze - arrived at an impasse between the 
‘virtual and actual’ or ‘becoming and being’ and his response to this was to posit a 
third mediating figure ‘the ‘quasi-cause’ or ‘pure agency of transcendental causality’ 
(Žižek 2004, quoted in Sinnerbrink, 2006, p.66). The quasi-cause ‘designates the 
advent of the New’, ‘that might account for the unforeseeable excess of the effect 
(the New) over its antecedent causal conditions’ (ibid).  This move, Žižek insists (and 
it is hard not to agree with Sinnerbrink that this comes across as ‘triumphal’), 
positions Deleuze as a Lacanian: ‘is the Deleuzian quasi cause not the exact 
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equivalent of Lacan’s objet petit a, this pure, immaterial, spectral entity that serves 
as the object-cause of desire?’ (Žižek, 2004, p.27). This recourse to the 
transcendental is however, Žižek says, problematic for Deleuze as the philosopher, 
par excellence, of immanence and it was this traumatic realisation that drove 
Deleuze into the Guattarian embrace: ‘Therefore, was Deleuze not pushed toward 
Guattari because Guattari presented an alibi, an easy escape from the deadlock of 
his previous position? (Žižek, 2004, p.21). The BwO, as the plane of immanence, is 
the Deleuze/Guattari way out from the impasse. But this resolution, Žižek suggests, 
leads to some unfortunate consequences for  Deleuze/Guattari and the BwO  
conceived as ‘the neo-romantic figure of the dissolved nomadic subject, whose 
decoded flows and libidinal becomings would supposedly provide a radical political 
critique in the face of globalised capitalism’ (Sinnerbrink, 2006, p.76). Žižek’s 
‘productive misreading’ (2004, p.ix) of Deleuze/Guattari enables us to see the source 
of the ambivalence of the BwO. Far from providing a radical political critique of global 
capitalism, the BwO, which can be interpreted as given over to ‘the need to reinvent 
oneself permanently, opening oneself up to the multitude of desires that push us to 
the limit’ (Žižek, 2004, p.183), in fact  justifies calling  ‘Deleuze the ideologist of late 
capitalism’ (Žižek, 2004, p.1847).
Smith (2004, p.636), however,  argues that Žižek is simply wrong and that 
Deleuze has not been diverted from his Lacanian position by a (personally 
motivated) anti-Lacanian Guattari. Rather, Deleuze/Guattari is Lacanian – at least, 
the Lacanian that Lacan would have become had he not been led astray by his 
followers.  Thus, Smith holds,  Deleuze was of the opinion that the co-implication of 
desire as both negative lack and as positive abundance was indeed present in 
Lacan’s own thought. Though it is fair to say Lacan was rather less generous 
towards Deleuze fuelled, as he was, by a  paranoid obsession with plagiarism. While 
telling Deleuze to his face ‘what I absolutely need is someone like you’  he  was 
simultaneously bad mouthing him, convinced that  Anti-Oedipus was based on his 
seminars, ‘which already, according to him, contained the idea of a “desiring 
machine”’ (Roudinesco, 1997, p.348). 
This anecdotal evidence provides some interesting insights into the Parisian 
milieu in which these ideas were being fomented, an excess which is all too easily 
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lost in academic prose.  Against the sterility of the page,  Žižek opens up an uberous 
field for critique with his provocations. 
So, a conclusion: identity and narrative 
I have talked about Lacan’s lacking subject  in two ways. Firstly, when we enter the 
symbolic realm we are colonised by language and our discourse becomes the 
discourse of the Other; and secondly, through this process we lose the Real. But this 
is to conflate two ‘poles of desire’ as Deleuze puts it (Smith 2004, p.642). Entry to the 
symbolic and the acceptance of the ‘law of language’ is a quasi-transcendental 
position; but Deleuze suggests the objet petit a, the tiny kernel of the Real 
precipitated out when the Other is split, can be regarded as ‘a desiring machine, 
which defines desire in terms of real production’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, p.28). 
In this conceptualisation, desire shifts  between transcendence and immanence such 
that ‘lack and abundance are mutually implicated as one is the condition of possibility 
for the other’ (Howarth, 2008, unpaginated). 
Thus, I constitute, through my identification, the University-at-the-time-of-the-
RAE at the exact same time as the University-at-the-time-of-the-RAE calls me into 
being as a subject. We are mutually constitutive. Both transcendent and immanent. 
A final note. At the outset I referred to  identification as a narrative space and 
there is something that connects this oscillation between the two poles of desire with 
the theory of narrative which sees narrative arising precisely in the movement 
between equilibrium and disequilibrium (Todorov, 1971) producing narrative as a 
motive force. Conceptualising identity as narratively constructed, predicated on an 
unstable accommodation between transcendence and immanence as the precarious 
condition of existence presents a rather neat climax to this initial exploration. 
Perhaps too neat, after all, in moving between equilibrium and disequilibrium  
narrative always seeks  to undo that which it has so carefully gathered together. But 
perhaps that is what drives identification.
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